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Bounds of Advocacy
Introduction: The Bounds of Advocacy
by
Robert H. Aronsont
I was asked, as Reporter for the American Academy of Matri-
monial Lawyers' Bounds of Advocacy, to provide an Introduction
to the substantive issues discussed by members of the Committee in
succeeding articles. This article will therefore "set the stage" by
indicating the need for the Bounds of Advocacy, the charge to the
Committee, the process by which the Standards and Comments
were drafted, re-drafted, and then re-drafted again, and the appro-
priate scope, purpose and use of the Standards and Comments.
I. Commencement of the Project
The Bounds of Advocacy Committee was appointed by then
Academy President James T. Friedman in November, 1987. His
initial thought was that it should be entitled, The Bounds of Advo-
cacy, a Guide to Fair Play in Divorce, and that since potential read-
ers would likely include lawyers, judges, litigants, the media and the
public at large, the writing style should not be legalistic.' In his
letter to the drafting committee President Friedman stated:
Our practice sometimes demands even higher standards in certain situa-
tions than the Code of Professional Conduct because of the uniqueness of
our practice, and the ironic conflict between the adversary system and a
client's best interests .... The publication should increase the visibility of
the Academy and should govern the conduct of Academy Fellows.
Academy applicants will be forewarned of the higher degree of profes-
sionalism that will be expected of them should they become Fellows.2
After several meetings in early 1988, the Committee spent a
number of months deciding on appropriate topics, grouping them
into categories, and formulating questions within each of the cate-
gories. During the rest of 1988 and early 1989, the Committee
drafted and refined questionnaires which were sent to the over 1200
Academy members in May, 1989. They provided room for fairly
t Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Washington
1 Personal letter of James T. Friedman on file in the office of Robert
Aronson.
2 Id.
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detailed comments and responses on a diverse array of issues. The
Academy members were divided into sixths, with a different ques-
tionnaire sent to each group. In late May, 1989, the Committee's
Chair, Steve Sessums, forwarded to me: (1) the originals of all re-
sponses to the questionnaires; (2) summaries from each Committee
member of the responses and issues raised concerning the subject
matter covered in his or her group of questions; and (3) a suggested
format for the final product. Following a meeting of the entire
Committee, I agreed to take the preliminary drafts of the issues and
recommendations and attempt to draw them together in a compre-
hensive statement and consistent style.
II. Evolutionary Process for Drafting of Bounds of
Advocacy
I started with the section on Conflict of Interest and circulated
a sample draft to ensure that I understood what the Committee en-
visioned for the scope and style before attempting additional sec-
tions. In addition to the chapter draft, I enclosed materials to
enable the Committee to see my drafting strategy and methodology.
First, I reviewed the returned questionnaires from Academy mem-
bers and the summaries by members of the Committee, making a
list of all of the issues raised, but concentrating on conflict of inter-
est. I then made a more detailed listing of conflicts issues raised by
Academy members and merged the analyses of conflicts issues that
Committee members had drafted. Finally, I organized the material
into descriptive topic headings, from which I drafted the chapter.
This method was adopted to ensure inclusion of issues raised by
Academy members in the questionnaires and Committee members
in their summaries and analyses. The same procedure was followed
for the first drafts of all subsequent chapters or sections.
The Committee suggested substantial changes in the draft.
The first Conflicts draft was 15 pages and contained 37 footnotes
that included references to codes of ethics, cases, treatises and law
review articles. The Committee's comments included: "style is too
scholarly"; "Too fluffy, not pragmatically oriented"; "Nobody will
read"; "Do not need to summarize majority versus minority views";
and "Citations should be reserved for those areas in which there is
possible conflict among the authoritative statements of professional
ethics, or on which we are taking a position in conflict with one of
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these." There were also a number of substantive suggestions and
changes proposed by the Committee, for example: "an attorney
should never have a sexual relationship with his client," "no attor-
ney should cooperate, promote or encourage any client to intention-
ally go meet with another lawyer so they would be disqualified from
representing their spouse," and "there is a duty to children which is
as important as the duty to our client which the attorney has an
obligation to balance."
In addition, the Committee determined that a number of con-
ventions should be employed in drafting the Standards. For exam-
ple, the ethical codes in different jurisdictions differ from the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (RPC), and from each other. It would be
virtually impossible to address all of the differences and variations.
Over 30 states have adopted some form of the RPC, with the re-
mainder retaining either the form or substance of the CPR. 3 The
Committee decided to use the official, ABA version of the RPC,
while pointing out areas in which there is significant variation
among the states.
The next draft of the Conflicts section went from 15 pages and
37 footnotes to 10 pages and 21 footnotes. An edited draft (now 9
pages and 17 footnotes4) was reviewed by the Committee in early
1990, and was again substantially revised. This process of drafts by
me, review by the Committee, re-drafts, and additional considera-
tion by the Committee, was repeated for the remaining sections un-
til all of the issues had been addressed.
The Committee met in July and September, 1990 to review re-
drafts of all the sections, and incorporated the suggestions and
changes from the various meetings. The re-drafts were then merged
into a single, coherent whole. At the September meeting, the Com-
mittee revised the new draft and approved it for distribution to a
limited number of family law experts (including the AAML Execu-
tive Committee, members of the Board, and a few highly regarded
law professors).
At several meetings in late 1990 and early 1991, the Bounds of
3 California, of course, has to do everything differently, and has its own
numbering system and even some different substance! Compare, e.g., Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct of the State Bar of California Rule 3-310 (1988) with Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7, 1.8(0, 1.8(g), 1.9 (1983).
4 The final draft of the Conflicts section is a trim 4 pages and 9 footnotes.
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Advocacy Committee considered every comment in every letter re-
turned by the family law experts, and the draft was revised in light
of those comments. The re-draft of the entire Standards, incorpo-
rating all of the revisions, was considered and approved (with the
addition of a number of suggested language changes) by the AAML
Executive Committee in February, 1991. The substantive provi-
sions were approved by the Board of Governors in March, and the
final version, including all minor editing and language changes, was
printed in the Fall, 1991.
III. Why Another Code of Ethics?
Since every state has an ethics code modeled on the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility or Rules of Professional Conduct, the
first question that might be asked is "Why did the AAML believe it
was necessary or desirable to promulgate the Bounds of Advo-
cacy?" Three primary rationales underlay the determination to
draft the Standards: (A) The importance of providing guidance for
attorneys to practice at an ethical level well above the minimum
necessary to avoid discipline; (B) the need to address ethical issues
unique, or particularly relevant, to family law practice; and (C) the
inherent value in evoking reconsideration and discussion of ethical
issues by family law attorneys.
(A) The Need for Aspirational Guidelines.
Canon 7 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) provides: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of the Law." Ethical Consideration 7-1 indi-
cates that the "bounds of the law" includes "Disciplinary Rules and
enforceable professional regulations." Many courts, bar discipli-
nary committees, and individual lawyers interpreted the CPR to
require that an attorney do everything the client desired, unless the
conduct would violate the law. 5 Those attorneys who believed that
certain desired conduct was harsh, ethically distasteful, or unneces-
sarily harmful to opposing parties, counsel, or other persons under-
5 See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1083, 1085 (1988) (explaining and criticizing this "Libertarian" model of lawyer-
ing). But see Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2 cmt. (1983) (attor-
neys not required to do everything the client directs); Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
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stood the CPR to require that they must nonetheless defer to their
clients' directives.
Partly in response to the overzealous representation occasioned
by the CPR and overly narrow interpretations of the "bounds of the
law," the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct ("RPC") omit the
zealous representation language. The Scope section of the Preamble
to the RPC provides that Rules cast in the terms "shall" or "shall
not" are imperatives and
define the proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others,
generally cast in the term "may," are permissive and define areas under
the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. No discipli-
nary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts
within the bounds of such discretion. 6
The Scope section further states, however, that the Rules do not
"exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a
lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined
by legal rules."'7 One of the primary purposes of the AAML Stan-
dards of Conduct is to provide some guidance concerning moral
and ethical considerations not fully explored or regulated in the
CPR or RPC.
In recent years, an increasing number of individual lawyers
and associations of lawyers have observed that a substantial gap ex-
ists between the minimum level of ethical conduct mandated by the
RPC, and the much greater level of professionalism to which all
attorneys should aspire." It has been noted that some attorneys
have ignored the Preamble's caution that the Rules do not "exhaust
the moral and ethical considerations" relevant to the practice of law
at the highest level. Local and state bar associations, along with a
number of state and federal courts, have adopted codes of profes-
sionalism in an attempt to establish a level of ethical practice well
above the minimum necessary to avoid discipline.9
The effort to provide guidance concerning elevation of the ethi-
6 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble (1983).
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 Ohio St. L.J.
551, 579 (1991); William C. Heffernan, The Moral Accountability of Advocates, 61
Notre Dame L. Rev. 36, 47 (1986).
9 See, e.g., Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 121
F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (federal court adopted Dallas Bar guidelines as court
rules). See also Catherine T. Clarke, Missed Manners in Courtroom Decorum, 50
Md. L. Rev. 945, 948 (1991) (". . Over twenty-six state and at least thirty-six local
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cal practice of matrimonial law beyond the minimum necessary to
avoid professional discipline is particularly appropriate for an or-
ganization whose creed is: "To encourage the study, improve the
practice, elevate the standards and advance the cause of matrimo-
nial law, to the end that the welfare of the family and society be
preserved." 10
(B) The Unique Nature of Family Law.
The RPC, of necessity, are addressed to all lawyers, regardless
of the nature of their practice. Although some Rules deal with spe-
cific issues relating to criminal defense lawyers or prosecutors or
other government attorneys, the general applicability to all lawyers
requires that issues relevant only to a specific area of practice can-
not be dealt with in detail, or cannot be addressed at all. Further,
as stated in the Preamble:
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a law-
yer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's
own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory
living. I I
The RPC attempt to provide a framework for resolving such con-
flicts, but, in an effort to provide rules of general applicability, the
resolution of conflicting responsibilities may not always be most ap-
propriate for a particular area of practice. Experience with the
Rules has led many Fellows of the American Academy of Matrimo-
nial Lawyers to observe instances of insufficient guidance or appar-
ently undesirable balancing of the family law attorney's
responsibilities in commonly encountered situations. 12 It was there-
fore important for the Academy to address issues specifically rele-
vant to family law attorneys and provide guidance in resolving some
of the most difficult conflicts between attorneys' obligations to their
clients, other persons affected by family law disputes, and their own
desire to see that justice is achieved.
In many ways, family law practice is unlike any other area of
legal representation. Family law disputes often result in a volatile
bar associations have conducted studies on professionalism or adopted codes of
professional conduct").
10 Creed, American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (established in 1962).
11 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble (1983).
12 See Leonard L. Bishop, The Standards of Practice for Family Mediators:
An Individual Interpretation and Comments, 17 Fam. L.Q. 461 (1984).
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and emotional atmosphere. It is extremely difficult for family law
attorneys to adequately represent the interests of their clients with-
out addressing the interests of other members of the clients' fami-
lies. 13 Unlike most other disputes in which the parties may harbor
a substantial amount of animosity, resentment or unresolved per-
sonal issues, the parties in matrimonial disputes may be required to
interact for years to come. In addition, the responses to the ques-
tionnaires sent to Academy Fellows revealed that many matrimo-
nial lawyers believe there should be greater recognition of their
obligation to consider the best interests of children, regardless of
which family member they may represent in a particular case. The
questionnaire responses indicated that the harm done to children in
an acrimonious family dispute was seen as the most significant
problem for which there is insufficient guidance in the RPC.
One of the most troubling conflict issues in family law relates
to the obligations a lawyer may owe to children. Although the sub-
stantive law in most jurisdictions concerning custody, abuse, and
termination of parental rights is premised upon the "best interests
of the child," the ethical codes provide little (or contradictory) gui-
dance for attorneys whose client's expressed wishes or interests are
in direct conflict with the well-being of one or more children. Ex-
amples of this dilemma, repeatedly raised by members of the Acad-
emy, include:
(1) The client asks his attorney to contest his wife's custody of the
children even though he concedes that his spouse is an effective par-
ent. He wants to do so either to gain leverage with respect to the
financial issues or simply out of spite.
(2) The client asks his attorney to vigorously attempt to gain cus-
tody of the children. While engaged in efforts on the client's behalf,
the attorney becomes convinced (or the client may even admit) that
the client has abused one of the children. Or the client is the wife,
and may herself be a good parent, but her live-in lover has abused
one of the children.
(3) The client indicates to her attorney that she is angry and vindic-
tive toward her spouse and wants the attorney to cause as much
grief, discomfort and cost to her spouse as is humanly possible. Or
the client instructs her attorney to interview one or more children
13 See, e.g., Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Coop-
erative Custody After Divorce, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 687 (1985).
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for the purpose of confirming allegations of poor parenting on the
part of the husband.
Some courses of action are clearly consistent with the attor-
ney's obligation under the RPC or CPR to promote the interests of
his client. First, although the client has the right to determine the
"objectives of representation," the attorney may limit the objectives
(with the client's consent) and the means by which the objectives
are to be pursued (after consultation with the client). 14 Some dis-
sension and bad feelings can be avoided by a frank discussion with
the client at the outset of the representation concerning how the
attorney handles cases such as the client's, including what the attor-
ney will and will not do with respect to vindictive conduct or ac-
tions likely to adversely affect the children's interests. Although not
essential, a letter to the client confirming the understanding, before
specific issues or requests arise, is advisable. To the extent that the
client is unwilling to accept any limitations on objectives or means,
the attorney should consider declining the representation.
If such a discussion did not occur, or the client despite any
understanding subsequently asks the attorney to engage in conduct
the attorney believes to be imprudent or morally repugnant, the at-
torney may attempt to convince the client that family harmony (or
at least armed neutrality!) or the interests of the children should be
taken into consideration. 15 In many cases, conduct in the interests
14 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2 (1983); see also Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.2 Comment (1983):
[A] lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or employ means simply
because a client may wish that the lawyer do so .... The terms upon
which representation is undertaken may exclude specific objectives or
means. Such limitations may exclude objectives or means that the lawyer
regards as repugnant or imprudent.
See generally, David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-
Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellman, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1004 (1990)
(Response to criticisms of Lawyers and Justice in which Luban examines the parti-
san, non-accountable standard conception of the lawyer's role).
15 Rule 2.1 provides in part: "In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not
only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and polit-
ical factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation." Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, Rule 2.1 (1983). Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-
36 (1980) provides:
Advice of a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal con-
siderations .... A lawyer should bring to bear upon this decision-making
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of the children or family unit will be in the client's long run best
interests as well.16
But what if, despite the attorney's efforts, the client insists that
the attorney assist in pursuing objectives or means the attorney be-
lieves to be morally unacceptable? The attorney may withdraw if
the client will not be adversely affected and if permission, when re-
quired, is granted by the court. 17 It may also be appropriate to seek
the appointment of a guardian ad litem or attorney for the child or
children.' 8 It should be noted that there is significant disagreement
among family law practitioners concerning the ethics of such a
course of action. According to one view, if suggestion of the need
for a guardian or attorney would be likely to affect the client ad-
versely (e.g., discovery of abuse or that the client is not an effective
parent), then the suggestion constitutes and impermissible under-
process the fullness of his experience as well as his objective viewpoint.
In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a
lawyer to point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is
morally just as well as legally permissible. He may emphasize the possi-
bility of harsh consequences that might result from assertion of legally
permissible positions.
16 See, e.g., Virginia A. Simons et al., A Study of Families in High-Conflict
Custody Disputes: Effects of Psychiatric Evaluation, 18 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry
Law 85 (1990); Kathleen A. Camara & Gary Resnick, Styles of Conflict Resolution
and Cooperation Between Divorced Parents: Effects of Child Behavior and Adjust-
ment, 59 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 560 (Oct. 1989); Janet R. Johnston et al., Ongo-
ing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint Custody and Frequent Access,
59 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 576 (Oct. 1989); Andre P. Derdeyn, The Post-Divorce
Family, Legal Practice, and the Child's Needs for Stability, 18 Children Today 12
(May-June 1989); Janet R. Johnston et al., Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict and Child
Disturbance, 15 J. Abnormal Child Psychol. 493 (Dec. 1987); Laurence Loeb, Fa-
thers and Sons: Some Effects of Prolonged Custody Litigation, 14 Bull. Am. Acad.
Psychiatry Law 177 (1986).
17 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.16, and Comment
(1983)
18 See, e.g., Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to be Heard and Repre-
sented in Judicial Proceedings, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 255 (1991); Abigail B. Sivan &
Mary Quigley-Rick, Effective Representation of Children By the Guardian Ad Li-
tern: An Empirical Investigation, 19 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry 53 (1991); Tara
Lea Mulhauser, From "Best" to "Better"' The Interests of Children and the Role of
a Guardian Ad Litem, 66 N.D. L. Rev. 633 (1990); Robyn-Marie Lyon, Comment,
Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev.
681 (1987); Note, Due Process for Children: A Right to Counsel in Custody Pro-
ceedings, 4 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 177 (1974).
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mining of the client's interests. 19 At the least, the client's consent,
after a full explanation of the risks, would be required, according to
this view.
A substantial number of Academy members, on the other
hand, believe that a request for appointment of a guardian or attor-
ney is either presently permitted under the ethical rules or should be
permitted (if not required). 20 In their view, the entire thrust of the
family law system is intended to give the best interests of the child
and child's well-being the highest priority. Therefore, an attorney
should not be able to justify her failure to act by relying on the
vindictiveness of a parent, ineffective legal representation of the
spouse, or the failure of the court to perceive sua sponte the need to
protect the child's interests. In addition, many Academy members
believe that even the appointment of a guardian or attorney for the
child is insufficient if the attorney is aware of abuse or similarly
severe parental deficiency. Nor would withdrawal (even if permit-
ted) solve the problem if the attorney is convinced that the child
will suffer extremely adverse treatment by the client.
In the most extreme cases, RPC 1.6(b)(1) would permit the
attorney to reveal information the lawyer reasonably believes neces-
sary "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm. '2 1 Many states have retained CPR DR 4-1O(C)(3)
permitting the attorney to reveal the intention of the client to com-
mit any crime and the information necessary to prevent it, while
others have broadened the RPC 1.6(b)(1) exception to the same ef-
fect. However, past conduct, and conduct that may be severely det-
rimental to the well-being of the child but not criminal, would not
19 See American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers Bounds of Advocacy
Committee meeting minutes, and responses of Academy members to
questionnaires.
20 Id.
21 The ABA Comment to Rule 1.6 states:
The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of such
factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with the client and with
those who might be injured by the client, the lawyer's own involvement
in the transaction and factors that may extenuate the conduct in ques-
tion. Where practical, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to
take suitable action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's inter-
est should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to
the purpose.
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be covered under either exception. 22
It would seem the essence of professionalism that an issue with
such substantial moral implications should permit greater discre-
tion on the part of family law practitioners. For those attorneys
who strongly adhere to the adversary system, with its emphasis on
absolute loyalty to the client, RPC 1.6 and DR 4-101 are permissive
only; the attorney may choose not to reveal information that is im-
portant to the well-being of the child but adverse to the client. At
the same time, the ethical codes should permit disclosure by those
practitioners (presently constituting a substantial number of Acad-
22 The ABA Comment to RPC 1.2 states: "An agreement concerning the
scope of representation must accord with the Rules of Professional Conduct and
other law." Therefore, it is at least arguable that, unless Rule 1.6 is amended to
permit (not require) disclosure of information the attorney reasonably believes nec-
essary to protect the well-being of a child, it would be impermissible for the attor-
ney to condition representation on the client's consent to disclosure.
Arguably, the parent's fiduciary obligation with respect to the well-being of a
child provides a basis for the attorney's consideration of the client's best interests
consistent with traditional adversary and client loyalty principles. It is accepted
doctrine that the attorney for a trustee or other fiduciary has an ethical obligation
to the beneficiaries or those to whom the fiduciary's obligations run. See, e.g.,
Fickett v. Superior Court, 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d 988 (1976) (holding lawyer
for former guardian of incompetent's estate liable to conservator of incompetent
for negligently failing to discover guardian's scheme and misappropriation). To
the extent that statutory or decisional law imposes a duty on the parent to act in
the child's best interests, the attorney for the parent might be considered to have an
obligation to the child that would, in some instances, justify subordinating the ex-
press wishes of the parent. See, e.g., ABA Comments to R.PC 1.14 ("If the lawyer
represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and is aware that the guardian is
acting adversely to the ward's interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to pre-
vent or rectify the guardian's misconduct") and RPC 1.2 ("Where the client is a
fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a
beneficiary"). See also Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mallison, 354 P.2d 800, 802 (Or.
1960) ("the duty owed by a parent to a child of tender years to preserve and pro-
tect his interest... is of a fiducial character"); cf 1990 amendment to Wash. RPC
1.6: "A lawyer may reveal to the tribunal confidences or secrets which disclose any
breach of fiduciary responsibility by a client who is a guardian, personal represen-
tative, receiver, or other court-appointed fiduciary." It would be anomalous, to say
the least, to permit an attorney to report a parent's misuse of the child's money,
but not permit reporting child abuse. See also Daly v. Derrick, 230 Cal. App. 3d
1349, 281 Cal. Rptr. 709, 717-18 (1991) (holding that a teacher who stands in loco
parentis has same fiduciary duty of disclosure of child abuse of his or her students
as the students' parents). For this analysis to be of benefit to family law practition-
ers, however, a clearer mandate would have to be adopted as part of the ethical
code or the official interpretations of it.
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emy Fellows) who reasonably believe it to be necessary to the well-
being of one or more of the children. Fairness to the client and
RPC 1.2 would require complete disclosure to the client, preferably
at the very outset of the representation. Either the Comments to
the RPC would have to make clear that such an agreement as to
limitation of means is permissible, or the rules would have to be
amended. In any event, guidance in this crucial area is clearly
needed, and AAML Standards of Conduct 2.23 to 2.27 and their
Comments attempt to provide that guidance.
Academy members believed the RPC to provide insufficient
guidance or regulation with respect to "Bombers" who engage in
"hardball" or "Rambo" tactics in an effort to wear down the oppo-
nent. Those lawyers who believe that "scorched earth" tactics are
the key to success in matrimonial litigation justify their "win at any
cost" behavior on the basis of zealous advocacy on the client's be-
half.23 In some cases this approach intimidates or wears down the
opponent, resulting in victory for the offensively aggressive (and ag-
gressively offensive) lawyer. More often, however, such tactics sim-
ply cause delay and divisiveness, increase expense, and waste
judicial resources.24 Enlightened lawyers hold the view that courte-
ous behavior is not a sign of weakness, but is consistent with force-
23 See, e.g., Stephanie B. Goldberg, Playing Hardball, 73 A.B.A. J. 48 (July,
1987); Roger C. Cramton, The Trouble With Lawyers (and Law Schools), 35 J.
Leg. Educ. 359 (1985); Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics
Don't Work 74 A.B.A. J. 79 (Mar. 1988); Andrew R. Herron, Collegiality, Justice,
and the Public Image: Why One Lawyer's Pleasure is Another's Poison, 44 U.
Miami L. Rev. 807 (1990).
24 See, e.g., Wrona v. Wrona, 592 So.2d 694, 697, 1991 n.4 (Fla. Ct. App.
1991) ("trial courts should understand that they have authority to take steps
designed to avoid needless expense during a divorce proceeding, especially if that
expense adversely affects the best interests of the children or jeopardizes the
sources for payment of needed alimony"); Katz v. Katz, 505 So. 2d 25, 26 (Fla.
App. 1987) ("Without responsible direction, not only will the parties-who are
represented-have their assets dissipated without good cause, but also their inno-
cent, unrepresented children will see their opportunity for higher education vanish
in a nightmarish plethora of motions, transcripts and time sheets."). See also
Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 121 F.R.D. 284, 288
(N.D. Tex. 1988) (adopting the Dallas Bar Association "Guidelines of Professional
Courtesy" as mandatory court rules):
Malfeasant counsel can expect . . .that their conduct will prompt an
appropriate response from the court, including the range of sanctions the
Fifth Circuit suggests in the Rule 11 context: "a warm friendly discus-
sion on the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court, compulsory
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ful and effective advocacy. The spirit of cooperation and civility
does not simply foster collegiality of the Bar, although that is cer-
tainly a welcome side effect, but also promotes justice and efficiency
in our legal system. The general public, as well as clients, have a
right to expect and demand a high standard of conduct by lawyers.
Various reasons have been advanced for the increased preva-
lence of rudeness and hardball tactics. These include the increase in
the number of practicing lawyers, resulting in less frequent interac-
tion with the same attorneys, youthful zeal and inexperience, self-
or partner-imposed financial pressures, and emphasis on winning at
all costs. These underlying factors are unlikely to be eliminated.
Rather, the problem is more likely to be solved, or at least amelio-
rated, by individual lawyers, firms, local bar associations, and
groups such as the AAML adopting practices that recognize and
require professionalism, respect and courtesy.
Academy Fellows indicated that the Bounds of Advocacy
should address issues of professionalism, from those as seemingly
trivial as returning phone calls promptly to issues as basic as always
keeping one's word. In addition, a number of areas of frequent
abuse were cited:
(1) Timing of motions and discovery;
(2) Scope of discovery requests and responses;
(3) Conduct at depositions; and
(3) Professional respect in oral and written communications.
Academy members, along with courts and commentators, stress
that although litigation can breed hard feelings between the liti-
legal education, monetary sanctions, or other measures appropriate to the
circumstances."
A number of judges around the country have drafted or adopted similar individual
standards for the conduct of attorneys in cases before them. All attorneys are
presented with a copy of the standards at the time a case is assigned to the judge.
And there is always resort to an order such as the one issued by Judge Wayne
Alley (W.D. Okla., 2/24/89) in Krueger v. Pelican Production Corp.:
If the recitals in the briefs from both sides are accepted at face value,
neither side has conducted discovery according to the letter and spirit of
the Oklahoma County Bar Association Lawyer's Creed. This is an as-
pirational creed not subject to enforcement by this Court, but violative
conduct does call for judicial disapprobation, at the least. If there is a
hell to which disputatious, uncivil, vituperative lawyers go, let it be one in
which the damned are eternally locked in discovery disputes with other
lawyers of equally repugnant attributes.
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gants, those sentiments need not and should not be imposed upon
the attorneys who represent those litigants, nor should those feel-
ings dictate how lawyers treat one another. The fundamental prin-
ciple is that lawyers should at all times treat each other with
respect, courtesy and fairness. Civil litigation should no longer be
viewed as an oxymoron. Standards 3.1 to 3.14 proved guidance in
this area for family law practitioners.
(C) The Role of the Standards of Conduct in Evoking Discussion
of Ethical Issues.
Probably the most valuable aspect of the entire Bounds of Ad-
vocacy project has been to engender a renewed interest in ethical
issues among Academy Fellows. From the thoughtful responses to
the questionnaires sent out in 1989, to the comments received by
Committee members throughout the drafting process, to the discus-
sions by Academy Fellows at Annual Meetings, the amount of at-
tention paid to important questions of the ethical practice of family
law has been dramatic. The Standards are aspirational and self-
enforcing. Since they are not intended to be the basis for discipline,
their primary value is in sensitizing attorneys to the issues and pro-
viding guidance concerning difficult problems.
In stating appropriate conduct above the minimum level man-
dated by the RPC, choices among possible alternatives had to be
made. The very failure of any authoritative group to provide gui-
dance for family law attorneys with respect to professionalism, civil-
ity, and the most difficult ethical issues provided the impetus for the
numerous codes of professionalism and the Bounds of Advocacy
project. The Standards of Conduct do represent preferences, some
of which are controversial, concerning the most appropriate con-
duct in situations that frequently confront matrimonial lawyers. In
such situations, it would be impossible to obtain universal agree-
ment concerning the proper balancing of an attorney's obligations
to the client, opposing parties and others affected by the representa-
tion, the attorney's own interests, and the interests of society.
The local and national publicity concerning the project and
promulgation of the AAML Standards of Conduct has resulted in
substantial discussion and debate about the practice of family law.
Whether matrimonial lawyers agree or disagree with particular
Standards and Comments, the Bounds of Advocacy has achieved
one of its major functions simply by engendering the debate.
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IV. The Standards of Conduct and Malpractice
Liability.
Whenever an organization of professionals drafts guidelines en-
titled "Standards of Conduct," the use of those guidelines to estab-
lish the standard of care in a discipline or malpractice action
becomes a matter of concern. 25 The Standards were intended to
address "gray" areas which are either unclear or not addressed at
all in the RPC or CPR. They provide guidance for attorneys who
wish to practice at an ethical and professional level well above the
duty of care defined for purposes of either professional discipline or
malpractice liability. As stated in the "Preliminary Statement" of
the Standards:
Conduct permitted by the RPC cannot be the basis for state bar or
court discipline. Hence, the Standards here established for matrimonial
lawyers use the terms "should" and "should not," rather than "must,"
"shall," "must not" and "shall not." Clearly, since these Standards pro-
mote a level of practice above the minimum established in the RPC, their
use to establish a duty of care in a malpractice action is inappropriate.26
Undoubtedly, efforts will be made by plaintiffs in legal mal-
practice actions to introduce evidence of violations of the Standards
of Conduct whenever it would support their cause of action. De-
spite the disclaimer in the RPC regarding use of violations of its
Rules as a basis for malpractice liability, 27 courts have differed in
the extent of their application of the disclaimer. A few courts, rely-
ing on the statement in the Scope section of the RPC,28 have refused
25 See generally Criton A. Constantinides, Note, Professional Ethics Codes in
Court: Redefining the Social Contract Between the Public and the Professions, 25
Ga. L. Rev. 1327 (1991); Xavier G. Medina & Virginia Coyle, Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct: Additional Liability for Texas Lawyers, 21 St.
Mary's L.J. 733 (1990); Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. McLaughlin, The Use of
Expert Witnesses in Establishing Liability in Legal Malpractice Cases, 61 Temp.
L.Q. 1351 (1988).
26 American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, BOUNDS OF ADVO-
CACY, Standard (1991).
27 The "Scope" section of the RPC provides:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules
are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed
to be a basis for civil liability.
28 Courts in jurisdictions governed by the CPR have interpreted similarly
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to admit any evidence of the violation of the RPC,29 and several
courts have held that the violation of the RPC (or CPR) constitutes
a rebuttable presumption of a breach of the duty of care.30 How-
ever, the majority of courts have held that the ethical code " 'does
not undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for
professional conduct' . . . . Nevertheless it certainly constitutes
some evidence of the standards required of attorneys. ' 31
The majority rule makes sense. If an attorney violates one of
the RPC Rules that are "imperatives, cast in the terms 'shall' or
'shall not' " and thereby "define proper conduct for purposes of
professional discipline, ' 32 it would be difficult to claim that the at-
torney's conduct had not fallen below that expected of a reasonably
competent and prudent lawyer. On the other hand, the violation of
a disciplinary rule in and of itself should not establish a violation of
the duty of care.33 The extent to which the rule was designed to
the language in the CPR "Preliminary Statement": "The Code makes no attempt
to ... define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct."
29 See, e.g., Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 830 P.2d 646 (1992). See
also Robert Dahlquist, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage
Actions Against Attorneys, 9 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 20 (1982) (arguing that Code of
Professional Responsibility is too vague to be of value in malpractice litigation).
30 See, e.g., Lipton v. Boesky, 110 Mich, App. 589, 313 N.W.2d 163, 166-7
(Mich. App. 1981):
The Code of Professional Responsibility is a standard of practice for at-
torneys which expresses in general terms the standards of professional
conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public, the
legal system, and the legal profession. Holding a specific client unable to
rely on the same standards in his professional relations with his own at-
torney would be patently unfair. We hold that, as with statutes, a viola-
tion of the Code is rebuttable evidence of malpractice.
31 Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1980). See also Mirabito v.
Liccardo, 4 Cal. App. 4th 41, 5 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1992) (not error to allow Calif.
RPC into evidence and use as basis for jury instructions); see also Gomez v. Haw-
kins Concrete Constr. Co., 623 F. Supp. 194, 199 (N.D. Fla. 1985); Ambrosio &
McLaughlin, supra, n.25 at 1362 n.52; Charles W. Wolfram, The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility as a Measure of Attorney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.
L. Rev. 281, 286 (1979).
32 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope section (1983). See also
Model Code of Professional Responsibility Preliminary Statement (1969): "The
Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character.
The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer
can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."
33 See, e.g., Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 830 P.2d 646 (1992);
Peck v. Meda-Care Ambulance Corp., 156 Wis. 2d 662, 673, 457 N.W.2d 538, rev.
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protect clients, as opposed to opposing parties or non-parties, the
nature of the surrounding circumstances, and the gravity of the vio-
lation, are all relevant in determining whether there was a breach of
the standard of care.
In any event, evidence of a violation of the AAML Standards
of Conduct would be unlikely to be admissible, even in courts em-
ploying the most expansive use of RPC violations in defining the
malpractice standard of care. Unlike the RPC and CPR, the Stan-
dards contain no mandatory provisions ("shall" or "shall not").
And, unlike the RPC and CPR, the Standards contain no provi-
sions that "state the minimum level of conduct below which no law-
yer can fall."' 34 Rather, the Standards (like the Comments to the
RPC and Ethical Considerations of the CPR) are aspirational in
nature and are intended to "describe optimum ethical behavior to-
ward which attorneys should strive."35 They are "directed primar-
ily to the 'gray' zone where even experienced, knowledgeable
matrimonial lawyers might have doubts."' 36 Since the Standards do
not state a minimum level of care and, in many instances take posi-
tions with which reasonable matrimonial lawyers might disagree,
they are for the most part irrelevant to whether a particular attor-
ney's conduct fell below the standard for malpractice.
Although the Standards themselves should be inadmissible in a
malpractice action, a court might permit an expert witness to dis-
cuss specific Standards as part of the basis for his or her opinion
concerning the duty of care.37 In such cases, the Standards are un-
likely to create an additional basis for liability for two reasons:
den., 458 N.W.2d 533 (1990) (no intent in code to create tort liability); Brown v.
Samalin & Bock, P.C., 155 A.D.2d 407, 547 N.Y.S.2d 80 (2d Dept. 1989) (even if
attorney violated code, such violation did not "in itself, generate a separate cause
of action"). See generally Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, LEGAL MAL-
PRACTICE § 6.27 (3d ed. 1989).
34 Model Code of Professional Responsibility Preliminary Statement (1969).
35 American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, BOUNDS OF ADVO-
CACY, Standard Preliminary Statement (1991). See generally discussion supra
pp. 4-5 and 12-13.
36 Id.
37 But see, Hizey v. Carpenter, 119 Wash. 2d 251, 830 P.2d 646, 654 (1992):
Such testimony may not be presented in such a way that the jury could
conclude it was the ethical violations that were actionable, rather than
the breach of the duty of care. In practice, this can be achieved by al-
lowing the expert to use language from the CPR or RPC, but prohibiting
explicit reference to them.
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First, to the extent that an expert believes that statements in the
Standards or Comments accurately reflect the present duty of care
of practicing family law attorneys, the expert would have so stated
in any event.38 Where a particular Standard simply addresses the
applicability of the RPC in the family law context, an expert who
believes the attorney acted improperly could just as easily rely upon
the underlying RPC.3 9
Second, even if an attorney is found to have violated the duty
of care at least in part based on a violation of the Standards, the
violation must be shown to have proximately caused any damage.4
Thus, fears that failure to return telephone calls or respond to let-
ters within a day will result in liability based on any duty set forth
in one of the Standards, 4 1 are misplaced. It would be a rare case
where any reputable expert would be willing to testify that the fail-
ure to return a telephone call within a day constituted conduct be-
38 The author has served as a consultant and expert witness in numerous
malpractice cases. If an attorney's conduct violated a Disciplinary Rule or RPC, it
most often (but not always) fell below the standard expected of a reasonably com-
petent, ethical and prudent attorney. If an attorney's conduct was permissible
under the relevant ethical code, but did not constitute what most practitioners
would consider "good practice," the plaintiff had no difficulty obtaining experts
who would state that the attorney violated the duty of care, despite the absence of
any (even aspirational) guidelines on the subject. In such cases, the attorney
presented opposing experts, and the trier of fact determined credibility. Thus, an
expert, who believes that an attorney violated a Standard in the Bounds of Advo-
cacy that accurately states what an ethical, prudent matrimonial would do in a
case in issue, would testify that the attorney violated the standard of care, whether
or not the Standards had been adopted.
39 The Bounds of Advocacy Committee received comments from three na-
tionally recognized ethics experts applauding Standard 2.16 ("An attorney should
never have a sexual relationship with a client or opposing counsel during the time
of the representation."). It was clear from their comments that they would have no
hesitancy testifying, on the basis of RPC 1.7(b), that a sexual relationship that
proximately caused damage to the client constituted malpractice.
40 See, e.g., Phillips v. Carson, 240 Kan. 462, 731 P.2d 820, 832-33 (1987).
In applying the attorney's violation of DR 5-104 (business relations with a client)
in a legal malpractice action, the court stated: "Finally, we agree with the trial
court that Carson's extensive breaches of the Code of Professional Responsibility
proximately caused injury to his client, and that she sustained substantial actual
damages."
41 See, e.g., American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, BOUNDS OF
ADVOCACY, Standard § 2.6 (1991) and Comment (attorney or staff member
should respond to telephone calls, "normally by the end of the next business day").
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low that reasonably expected of competent attorneys. And it would
be an even rarer case where the proximate cause of a client's finan-
cial injury was due to failure to return a telephone call within a day.
V. Conclusion.
The Standards of Conduct demonstrate the American Acad-
emy of Matrimonial Lawyers' commitment to elevate the ethical
standards and practice of matrimonial lawyers, and to encourage
the study and discussion of ethical issues. The Academy has boldly
promulgated guidelines that bridge the gap between the minimum
required by the RPC and CPR to avoid discipline and the high level
of ethics and professionalism to which all Academy Fellows aspire,
but the parameters of which are not always clear. Not only Fel-
lows, but all matrimonial lawyers, will benefit from the thought,
debate and analysis that resulted in the promulgation of the
Standards.
The Standards of Conduct also serve as a model for other orga-
nizations of attorneys. The generality of the RPC of necessity pre-
cludes application and elaboration specific to a particular area of
practice. Organizations of attorneys with unique ethical problems
would provide a substantial benefit to members by emulating the
efforts of the AAML.
At a time when public opinion of lawyers may well be at an all
time low, an essential element in restoring public esteem may well
be the Academy's voluntary effort to provide guidelines designed to
reduce the financial and emotional cost of matrimonial litigation,
establish better attorney-client communication and interaction, and
enable family law attorneys to rely on the candor, fairness and civil-
ity of opposing counsel.
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